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Abstract
Elliptic curves over finite fields F2n play a prominent role in modern cryptography. Published quan-
tum algorithms dealing with such curves build on a short Weierstrass form in combination with affine or
projective coordinates. In this paper we show that changing the curve representation allows a substantial
reduction in the number of T -gates needed to implement the curve arithmetic. As a tool, we present a
quantum circuit for computing multiplicative inverses in F2n in depth O(n logn) using a polynomial
basis representation, which may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Binary elliptic curves form an especially important family of groups for cryptographic applications, and
the implementation of their addition law in a quantum circuit has been studied by a number of authors
[11, 13]. To the best of our knowledge, in all these discussions the representation used for elliptic curves
is a short Weierstrass form in combination with affine or projective coordinates. While this is a natural
choice, restricting to such representations does not exploit the available technical machinery—there is a
substantial body of work on how to optimize elliptic curve arithmetic on classical hardware architectures
(cf. [4]), and one may hope that some of these classical results allow for simplification at the circuit level
when implementing binary elliptic curve arithmetic in a quantum circuit, e. g., when trying to find discrete
logarithms [21]. For an actual implementation, the number of T -gates needed to implement such a circuit
is particularly of interest and it is desirable to keep this number as small as possible. The reason for this
is that for most fault-tolerant quantum computing schemes, the implementation of T -gates is achieved via
so-called magic state distillation [6, 7, 18], a process which is costly in terms of physical resources required.
For instance, in the case of the surface code, it is reasonable to assume that a single T -gate has a cost that
is about 100 times higher than a single CNOT [7]. While minimizing the total number of T -gates is the
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prime objective of circuit synthesis at the logical level, the total depth of the computation when arranged as
an alternation between T -gates and Clifford gates (the so-called “T -depth”) is also an important parameter.
It is desirable to keep the T -depth low by parallelizing T -gates as much as possible.
Our contribution. Below, we show how changing the curve representation can help to reduce the number
of T -gates needed to implement elliptic curve arithmetic—and in addition help to reduce the circuit depth.
The quantum circuit we present makes use of point addition formulae suggested by Higuchi and Takagi [9]
and can in particular be used to reduce the number of gates as well as the depth, in comparison to the use of
ordinary projective coordinates (cf. [13]).
Some applications of elliptic curves may require unique representations of curve points (cf. [13]). When
dealing with representations for fast arithmetic, deriving a unique point representation may involve an in-
version in the underlying finite field. In a polynomial basis representation, a quantum implementation of
the extended Euclidean algorithm can be used for this inversion, however the circuit has O(n3) gates and
quadratic depth [11, 14, 13]. For other field representations, an inversion algorithm with depth O(n log n)
and O(n2 log n) gates has been proposed [1]. In order to compute unique point representations using a poly-
nomial basis more efficiently, we adapt the approach from [1] to the polynomial basis setting. In this way
we obtain the first published quantum circuit using a polynomial basis representation which can compute
inverses in F∗2n in depth O(n log n) with O(n2 log n) gates.
2 Fixing a finite field representation
Fast addition formulae for points on an elliptic curve over a finite binary field F2n aim at reducing the
number of (expensive) F2n-operations. The following operations are of particular interest:
Addition: Given α, β ∈ F2n , compute their sum α+ β.
Multiplication: Given α, β ∈ F2n , compute their product α · β.
Multiplication with a constant: For a fixed non-zero constant γ ∈ F∗2n , on input α ∈ F2n , compute γ · α.
The value γ, for example, could be a coefficient in the defining equation of an elliptic curve.
Squaring: Given α ∈ F2n , compute α2.
If one is interested in a unique representation of curve points, then the inversion of F2n-elements also comes
into play.
Inversion: Given α ∈ F∗2n , find α−1 ∈ F2n .
The specific cost of each operation depends on how the field F2n is represented, and in the next two sections
we look at three representations that have been considered in the literature on quantum circuits.
2.1 Polynomial basis representation
In a polynomial basis representation, F2n is identified with a quotient F2[x]/(f) where f ∈ F2[x] is an
irreducible polynomial of degree n. Each α ∈ F2n is represented by the unique sequence (α0, . . . , αn−1) ∈
F
n
2 with α =
∑n−1
i=0 x
i+(f). In a quantum circuit, we store each coefficient αi in a separate qubit. Quantum
arithmetic in such a representation has been explored by a number of authors, including Beauregard et al.
[3], Kaye and Zalka [11], and Maslov et al. [13]. For each of the four basic tasks mentioned above, the
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exact implementation complexity varies depending on the particular choice of f and efficient circuits are
available:
Addition: As addition is defined coefficient-wise, n CNOT gates are sufficient to derive the representation
of α + β from those of α and β. These gates operate on disjoint wires and can be implemented in
depth 1. To realize an addition |α〉 |β〉 |0〉 7→|α〉 |β〉 |α+ β〉 where the sum is stored in a separate
register, we can first add |α〉 to |0〉, followed by adding |β〉, i. e., 2n CNOT gates and depth 2 suffice.
In particular, we do not need a single T -gate to implement F2n-addition.
Multiplication: Building on a classical Mastrovito multiplier [15, 16, 19], in [13] a linear depth quantum
circuit is presented which derives the product α · β from α, β ∈ F2n . This circuit requires n2 Toffoli
gates and n2−1 CNOT gates. In particular, the T -gate complexity of a full F2n-multiplication is quite
substantial.1
Multiplication with a constant: Fix γ ∈ F∗2n . As multiplication with γ is F2-linear, invoking a general
multiplier is not necessary. Instead, we can realize multiplication by γ as a matrix-vector multipli-
cation with a suitable non-singular matrix Γ. An LUP -decomposition of Γ immediately yields a
depth 2n circuit that is comprised of no more than n2 + n CNOTs. No Toffoli gates are needed.
Squaring: No dedicated quantum circuit to implement the squaring map |α〉 |0〉 7→|α〉 |α2〉 has been
proposed, but as squaring in F2n is F2-linear, it is enough to implement a matrix-vector multiplication
in depth 2n using no more than n · (n+ 1) = n2 + n CNOTs. No Toffoli gates are needed.
Summarizing, among the above mentioned four basic operations, only the general multiplication involves
T -gates, and their number unfortunately grows quadratic in the extension degree n. In cryptographic appli-
cations of elliptic curves, values of n ≥ 160 are common. Hence, if we can save a general F2n-multiplication
at the expense of some additions, squarings or constant multiplications, this can be of great value for the
implementor of a quantum circuit.
So far, our discussion has ignored the inversion operation. The current literature offers only a circuit
with a cubic number of gates and quadratic depth [11], making the two representations discussed in the next
section seemingly more attractive for inversion. However, in Section 2.3 below, we will show that both the
cubic gate complexity and the quadratic depth of this operation can be avoided by adapating the inversion
technique used in [1] to the polynomial basis setting.
2.2 Gaussian normal basis and ghost-bit basis representations
Aiming for a more efficient inversion algorithm, in [1] two field representations are considered that differ
from the polynomial basis representation just discussed: a ghost-bit basis and a Gaussian normal basis
representation. For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to discuss their technical details, and we
restrict to looking at the cost of the relevant arithmetic operations:
Addition: With a Gaussian normal basis, addition can be performed in the same way as with a polynomial
basis. If a ghost-bit basis is available, elements in F2n are represented with n + 1 bits, resulting
again in two approaches for the addition. One approach is to add |α〉 to |β〉 yielding one additional
CNOT gate and a depth 1 circuit. The other approach is to add |α〉 followed by |β〉 to |0〉 yielding
two additional CNOT gates and a depth 2 circuit. Apart from these details, the addition operation is
exactly the same as when using a polynomial basis representation.
1With a realization of [2], a Toffoli gate can be implemented without ancillae with seven T -gates (or T †-gates which we assume
to have the same cost) in a circuit that has a T -depth of 3.
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Multiplication: If a ghost-bit basis is available, the multiplication α · β of two field elements α, β ∈ F2n
can be realized in depth n+ 1 using (n+ 1)2 Toffoli gates.
With a Gaussian normal basis of type t, a quantum circuit of depth (t+ (t mod 2)) · n− 1 involving
(t+ (t mod 2)) · n2 − n Toffoli gates is available for multiplying two elements in F2n .
Multiplication with a constant: Choosing the matrix Γ in accordance with the Gaussian normal basis or
the ghost-bit basis, we can proceed as in the case of a polynomial basis. For a Gaussian normal basis
this yields a circuit with n2 + n CNOTs, and as a result of the extra bit used in a ghost-bit basis, for
the latter we obtain a quantum circuit comprised of (n+1) · (n+2) = n2+3n+2 CNOT gates. No
Toffolis are needed.
Squaring: This operation is for free since the square of a field element can be obtained by simply reading
the coefficient vector in permuted order. Hence, no gates are required to implement the squaring
operation and we require n respectively n+1 CNOTs, all operating in parallel, to implement the map
|α〉 |0〉 7→|α〉 |α2〉, .
Again, in terms of T -gate complexity, multiplication is the dominating operation, and the number of squaring
operations in formulae for fast elliptic curve addition can be expected to be quite small. Consequently, using
a polynomial basis representation looks preferable, even if the particular extension degree of interest affords
a Gaussian normal basis of small type.
However, taking the computation of inverses into account—an operation that occurs in the derivation of
a unique representation of a curve point—the situation seems to become more involved: In [1] an inversion
circuit of depth O(n log n) involving O(n2 log n) gates has been presented. Compared to the quadratic
depth and cubic gate complexity of the best published inversion circuit using a polynomial basis [11], this
looks quite attractive. While [11] builds on Euclid’s algorithm, [1] builds on a classical technique by Itoh
and Tsujii [10], which exploits that an efficient squaring algorithm is available. As mentioned, in the case
of a Gaussian normal basis or a ghost-bit basis representation, the squaring operations in a quantum circuit
are actually for free. To overcome the cubic gate complexity and quadratic depth requirements of inversion
using a polynomial basis, the next section shows how to apply Itoh and Tsujii’s algorithm with a polynomial
basis.
2.3 Itoh-Tsujii inversion with a polynomial basis representation
Let α ∈ F2n be non-zero. As α−1 = α2
n
−2
, the inverse of α can be computed through exponentiation.
Itoh and Tsujii proposed a particularly efficient method to compute this power (see [10, 23, 20, 8]), if the
squaring operation in F2n is inexpensive. The quantum circuits for inversion in [1] use exactly this technique
when working with a field representation where squaring is just a permutation of the coefficient vector. Here
we want to show that even with a polynomial basis, this approach is a very attractive alternative to Euclid’s
algorithm. To describe Itoh and Tsujii’s approach, it is convenient to introduce some notation: for i ≥ 0 we
define βi = α2
i
−1
. Then our goal is to find α−1 = (βn−1)2 from β1 = α. For this we exploit that
βi+j = βi · β
2i
j (1)
for all i, j ≥ 0. Writing n− 1 =
∑hw(n−1)
i=1 2
ki with ⌊log2(n− 1)⌋ = k1 > k2 > · · · > khw(n−1) ≥ 0, Itoh
and Tsujii’s strategy to find α−1 can be summarized in three steps:
(I) Repeatedly apply Equation (1) with i = j to find all of β20 , β21 , . . . , β2k1 .
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(II) Use Equation (1) to find β2k1+2k2 , β2k1+2k2+2k3 , . . . , β2k1+2k2+···+2khw(n−1) (= βn−1).
(III) Compute α−1 = (βn−1)2.
Computing a value βi+j from given values βi, βj by means of Equation (1) involes one multiplication and an
exponentiation by a fixed power of 2. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the multiplication can be implemented
with n2 Toffolis plus n2 − 1 CNOT gates in a quantum circuit of depth O(n). Differing from the situation
in [1], the exponentiation with 2i is not for free, but as the map ξ 7→ ξ2i is F2-linear and bijective, we can
implement it as a matrix-vector multiplication with a suitable non-singular n×nmatrix having entries in F2.
Thence, using an LUP-decomposition of this matrix, the needed exponentiation can be realized with n2+n
CNOT gates in depth 2n. Summarizing, we see that in a polynomial basis representation, one evaluation of
Equation (1) can be realized in depth O(n) using n2 Toffolis and 2n2 + n− 1 CNOT gates.
Step (I) in the above procedure requires ⌊log2(n − 1)⌋ − 1 evaluations of Equation (1), i. e., this step
can be realized in depth O(n log2 n) by means of (⌊log2(n− 1)⌋ − 1) · n2 Toffolis and O(n2 log n) CNOT
gates. In Step (II), performing hw(n − 1) − 1 evaluations of Equation (1) sequentially, we obtain a depth
of O(n log n), involving (hw(n − 1) − 1) · n2 Toffolis and O(n2 log n) CNOT gates. Step (III) is just a
matrix-vector multiplication with a suitable non-singular n×n matrix, and using an LUP-decomposition of
the latter, a quantum circuit with no more than n2 + n CNOT gates can realize this squaring in depth 2n.
To ‘uncompute’ ancilla, we run the complete circuit—with exception of the final squaring—‘backwards’
and obtain the following:
Proposition 2.1. In a polynomial basis representation, α−1, the inverse of an element α ∈ F2n , can be
computed in depth O(n log2(n)) using 2 · (⌊log2(n− 1)⌋+hw(n− 1)− 2) ·n2 = O(n2 log n) Toffolis and
O(n2 log n) CNOT gates. This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Remark 2.1. Organizing the computation of βn−1 in Step (II) in a tree structure, the circuit depth for this
step can be reduced to O(n log log n), but because of Step (I), for the overall depth of the inverter we still
obtain the bound O(n log2 n).
Even though the squaring operation is not for free, in terms of T -gate complexity, this inverter seems
quite competitive to the ones presented in [1] for ghost-bit and Gaussian normal basis representations.
Thence, in the remainder of this paper we assume that a polynomial basis representation of the underly-
ing field F2n is used.
3 Binary elliptic curves
Let n ∈ N be a positive integer and F2n a finite field of size 2n. For cryptographic applications, typical
values are n ∈ {163, 233, 283} [17]. Perhaps the most common representation of ordinary elliptic curves in
characteristic 2 is a short Weierstrass form, given by a polynomial in F2n [x, y]:
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x
2 + a6 (2)
Here a2, a6 ∈ F2n , with a6 6= 0, and for practical purposes one often has a2 ∈ {0, 1} (cf. [17]). We write
Ea2,a6(F2n) := {(u, v) ∈ F2n : v
2 + uv = u3 + a2u
2 + a6} ∪ {O}
for the (F2n-rational points on the) elliptic curve given by Equation (2). The point O ∈ Ea2,a6(F2n) corre-
sponds to the ‘point at infinity.’2 Because of a6 6= 0, we have (0, 0) 6∈ Ea2,a6(F2n), suggesting (0, 0) ∈ F22n
2More technically, O is the unique point that is obtained when passing to the projective closure of Ea2,a6 .
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as convenient representation ofO. Hence, each curve point can be naturally represented as a pair of two field
elements (which fit into 2n qubits). The elliptic curve Ea2,a6(F2n) is equipped with a natural group struc-
ture, where O serves as the identity. Namely, for P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2), their sum P3 = P1 + P2
can be computed by the procedure in Figure 1, which is taken from [22].
if P1 = O then return P2
if P2 = O then return P1
if x1 = x2 then if y1 + y2 = x2 # P1 = −P2
then return O
else λ← x2 + y2/x2 # P1 = P2
x3 ← λ
2 + λ+ a2
y3 ← x
2
2 + (λ+ 1)x3
else λ← (y1 + y2)/(x1 + x2) # P1 6= ±P2
x3 ← λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a2
y3 ← (x2 + x3)λ+ x3 + y2
return (x3, y3)
Figure 1: adding two points on the elliptic curve y2 + xy = x3 + a2x2 + a6
3.1 Choosing a curve representation: the cost of adding a fixed point
Before looking at the task of implementing a general point addition P1+P2, it is worthwhile to consider the
special case when P1 6= O 6= P2, P1 6= ±P2, and P2 is a fixed point. In a discrete logarithm computation
as discussed in [11, 13], this is the only case needed, i. e., only the very last case of the addition law in
Figure 1 needs to be taken into account. Still, when using affine coordinates, the addition law involves an
inversion in F2n and as indicated by the discussion in Section 2, this inversion operation is typically (much)
more expensive to implement than addition or multiplication in F2n . Therefore, relying on a projective
formulation of the group law is a natural choice when designing quantum circuits. In projective coordinates,
each (x, y) ∈ Ea2,a6(F2n) \ {O} is represented by a triple (X,Y,Z) ∈ F32n such that X/Z = x and
Y/Z = y, and O is represented by a triple (0, Y, 0) ∈ F32n with Y 6= 0. These triples are only unique up to
multiplication with a non-zero element in F2n . Maslov et al. [13] exploit this freedom to restrict the number
of of finite field inversion circuits in a discrete logarithm computation. In particular, they observe that as
long as such a (non-unique) projective representation is sufficient, the addition of a constant curve point can
be realized in linear depth.
To the best of our knowledge, no detailed (gate-level) analysis of how to add a fixed point on an elliptic
curve has been published. Subsequently we note that—even with a clever implementation of projective
coordinates—the T -gate complexity of such a quantum circuit can be reduced substantially by passing to
a different curve representation. As a welcome aside, it seems that simultaneously the circuit depth can be
brought down.
3.1.1 Mixed addition with projective coordinates
For the fixed point that is to be added, one can assume an affine representation is available leaving no need to
handle a general ‘Z-coordinate’ for this operand. So using projective coordinates, a natural (non-trivial) way
to implement the addition of a fixed point is to apply the madd-2008-bl formulae from [4]: with the curve
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parameter a2 as in Equation (2) these formulae derive a projective representation (X3, Y3, Z3) of P1 + P2
with twelve F2n-multiplications, three of them having one operand fixed (namely, one operand is x2, y2 or
a2), seven F2n-additions, and one squaring.
A = Y1 + Z1 · y2, B = X1 + Z1 · x2, AB = A+B,
C = B2, E = B · C, F = (A ·AB + a2 · C) · Z1 + E,
X3 = B · F,
Y3 = C · (A ·X1 +B · Y1) +AB · F,
Z3 = E · Z1.
Translating these formulae one by one immediately yields a quantum circuit in which the number of Toffolis,
respectively T -gates, is determined by the nine general F2n-multiplications. To reduce the circuit depth,
we can try to parallelize some of the computations. Adding some CNOT gates to create ‘work copies’ of
intermediate results, we can enable parallelization without increasing the number of T -gates. To characterize
the complexity of the resulting quantum circuit, we write DM (n) for the depth of an F2n-multiplier
|α〉 |β〉 |ξ〉 7→|α〉 |β〉 |ξ + αβ〉,
and GM (n) for the number of gates required to implement such a multiplier. Further, we write DTM (n)
for the T -depth of an F2n-multiplier and GTM (n) for the number of T -gates required to implement such a
multiplier. We assume that DM (n), GM (n), DTM (n), and GTM (n) include the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Squaring operations and multiplications with a non-zero constant can be implemented with no more than
n2 + n CNOT gates in depth 2n each. As a functional composition of squarings and multiplications by a
non-zero constant can be combined into a single invertible F2-linear map (through matrix multiplication),
any fixed functional composition of squarings and non-zero constant multiplications can be implemented in
depth 2n with n2 + n CNOT gates as well.
Proposition 3.1. The point addition |X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 −→|X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |X3〉 |Y3〉 |Z3〉 can be
implemented in overall depth 6DM (n) plus 8n+O(1) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), and T -depth
6DTM (n). Further, a total of 15GM (n) gates and 8n2 + O(n) CNOT gates suffice. The total number of
T -gates is 15GTM (n). This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Here (X3, Y3, Z3) is some projective representation of P1 + P2 and P2 ∈ Ea2,a6(F2n) a fixed point,
represented with affine coordinates (x2, y2).
Proof: To implement the madd-2008-bl formulae we can proceed as follows:
1. Create a ‘work copy’ Z ′1 of Z1 using n CNOT gates, all of which operate in parallel. Then compute
Z1 · y2 and Z ′1 · x2 in parallel and store these values in separate (| 0〉-initialized) registers, using
2 · (n2 + n) CNOT gates and depth 2n.
2. Using 2n CNOT gates, all operating in parallel, add Y1 to Z1 · y2 and add X1 to Z ′1 · x2, so that those
registers now hold A and B respectively. Using 2n additional CNOT gates and increasing the circuit
depth by 2, we can also store AB = A + B in a new (|0〉-initialized) register. Moreover, using 2n
CNOT gates, we can in constant depth provide ‘work copies’ A′ of A and B′ of B.
3. Using n2 + n CNOT gates, we can now compute C = B2 in depth 2n. If a2 6= 0, with no more than
n2 + n additional CNOT gates we can in parallel determine a2 · (B′)2.
4. Using four multiplication circuits that operate in parallel, we can now compute E = B · C , A · AB,
A′ ·X1 and B′ · Y1 in depth DM (n), using 4 ·GM (n) gates.
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5. Next, using ≤ 2n CNOT gates that operate in parallel we can add A′ ·X1 to B′ ·Y1 and—if a2 6= 0—
A ·AB to a2 · (B′)2.
6. With three general F2n-multipliers we can now compute (A·AB+a2 ·(B′)2)·Z ′1,C ·(A′ ·X1+B′·Y1),
Z3 = E · Z1 and store these values in new registers. For this, depth DM (n) and 3 · GM (n) gates
suffice.
7. By adding (A · AB + a2 · C) · Z ′1 to E we obtain the value F in depth 1—involving n CNOT gates.
Increasing the depth by 1 and adding n more CNOT gates, we can also create a ‘work copy’ F ′ of F .
8. Invoking two more multiplication circuits, we can obtain X3 = B · F and AB · F ′ in depth DM (n)
with 2 ·GM (n) gates.
9. Finally, adding AB ·F ′ to C · (A′ ·X1+B′ ·Y1) yields Y3, and this addition can be realized in depth 1
with n CNOT gates.
To clean up ancillae, the circuit is run backwards, excluding the final multiplications to compute Z3 = E ·Z1,
X3 = B ·F , the multiplication C ·(A′ ·X1+B′ ·Y1), and the final addition to compute Y3. This increases the
overall depth by 3DM (n) plus 4n+O(1) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), the T -depth by 3DTM (n),
the gate count by an additional 6GM (n) plus 4n2 + O(n) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), and the
T -gate count by 6GTM (n). 
3.1.2 Mixed addition with a formula by Higuchi and Takagi
Building on earlier work by Lo´pez and Dahab [12], in [9] Higuchi and Takagi suggest a method to add
points on an elliptic curve, which requires fewer multiplications than the madd-2008-bl formulae we just
discussed. Again, we consider the case of a point addition P1+P2 with P1 6= ±P2 and P1 6= O 6= P2, where
P2 is fixed. Instead of the usual projective coordinates (X,Y,Z) with x = X/Z and y = Y/Z satisfying
Equation (2), Higuchi and Takagi choose a projective representation with x = X/Z and y = Y/Z2. The
corresponding projective formulation of Equation (2) then becomes
Y 2 +XY Z = X3Z + a2X
2Z2 + a6Z
4,
and the identity element O is represented by (X, 0, 0) ∈ F32n with X ∈ F∗2n arbitrary. For adding a curve
point P1 represented in these coordinates by (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ F32n to a fixed curve point P2 given by affine
coordinates (x2, y2) ∈ F22n , ten F2n-multiplications along with nine F2n-additions and three squarings
suffice. In two of the ten multiplications one operand is constant:
A = x2 · Z1, B1 = X
2
1 , B2 = A
2,
C = X1 +A, D = B1 +B2, E = y2 · Z
2
1 ,
F = Y1 + E, G = F · C,
Z3 = Z1 ·D,
X3 = X1 · (E +B2) +A · (Y1 +B1),
Y3 = (X1 ·G+ Y1 ·D) ·D + (G+ Z3) ·X3.
Allowing an additional squaring, which does not affect the T -gate complexity, the formula for Y3 can be
rewritten as
Y3 = X1 ·D ·G+ Y1 ·D
2 + (G+ Z3) ·X3. (3)
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This latter formulation is helpful in deriving a quantum circuit with fewer T -gates and a lower depth than
the one in Proposition 3.1:
Proposition 3.2. The point addition
|X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 −→|X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |X3〉 |Y3〉 |Z3〉
can be implemented in overall depth 4DM (n) plus 4n + O(1) (the latter being CNOT gates), and T -depth
4DTM (n). Further, a total of 13GM (n) gates and 8n2 + O(n) CNOT gates suffice. The total number of
T -gates is 13GTM (n). This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Here (X3, Y3, Z3) is some projective representation of P1 + P2 as used by Higuchi and Takagi and P2
a fixed curve point that is represented with affine coordinates (x2, y2).
Proof: To implement the point addition formulae by Higuchi and Takagi we can proceed as follows:
1. Using 3n CNOT gates, in depth 2 we create ‘work copies’ X ′1 of X1 as well as Z ′1, Z ′′1 and Z ′′′1 of Z1.
2. With no more than 4 · (n2 + n) CNOT gates, use the matrix-vector multiplications to compute A =
x2 ·Z1, B1 = X
2
1 ,B2 = (x2 ·Z
′
1)
2 and E = y2 ·(Z ′′1 )2 which can be performed in parallel in depth 2n.
To be able to compute D2, using 2 · (n2 + n) CNOT gates, we also compute in parallel B21 = (X ′1)4
and B22 = (x2 · Z ′′′1 )4.
3. Using O(n) CNOT gates and constant depth we can now store C = X1 +A, D = B1 +B2, a ‘work
copy’ D′ of D, and F = Y1+E in separate registers. Moreover, maintaining constant depth and with
a linear number of CNOT gates, we can also store E + B2, Y1 + B1, and D2 = B21 + B22 ; the latter
three values will be used for computing X3 and Y3 respectively.
4. Now, using six general F2n-multipliers, we can in parallel compute G = F · C , Z3 = Z1 · D,
X1 · (E + B2), A · (Y1 + B1), X
′
1 · D
′
, and Y1 · D2. For this, 6 · GM (n) gates and depth DM (n)
suffice.
5. At this point, O(n) CNOT gates and constant depth are adequate to compute X3 = X1 · (E +B2) +
A · (Y1 +B1) and G+ Z3 and store these values in new registers.
6. With two more multipliers that operate in parallel, (X ′1 ·D′) ·G and (G+Z3) ·X3 can be computed.
Using 2 ·GM (n) gates, this can be accomplished in depth DM (n).
7. Finally, using O(n) CNOT gates and depth 2, with Equation (3) we can compute Y3 = X1 ·D′ ·G+
Y1 ·D
2 + (G + Z3) ·X3.
To clean ancillae, we run the circuit backwards with the exception of the the final additions to compute Y3
and X3 and the multipliers to compute Z3 = Z1 ·D, (G + Z3) ·X3 and A · (Y1 + B1). This increases the
overall depth by 2DM (n) plus 2n+O(1) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), the T -depth by 2DTM (n),
the gate count by an additional 5GM (n) plus 6n2 + O(n) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), and the
T -gate count by 5GTM (n). 
Comparing Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, we see that passing from the usual projective represen-
tation to the one used by Higuchi and Takagi results in a significant saving in the total number of gates and
T -gates while reducing the circuit depth and T -depth. Thence, replacing the usual projective addition in
the quadratic depth solution for the discrete logarithm problem in [13] with the addition discussed in this
section is an attractive implementation option.
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3.2 Implementing a general point addition using Edwards curves
In view of the case distinctions in the addition law in Figure 1, implementing a quantum circuit that properly
handles all cases of a point addition appears to be a somewhat burdensome task: in addition to the ‘generic
case’ P1 6= ±P2 (with P2 not being fixed) and P1 6= O 6= P2, we have to implement a doubling formula
(P1 = P2), making sure that the identity element is handled properly (P1 = −P2, P1 = O or P2 = O). It is
important to note here that testing the branching conditions in Figure 1 comes at a certain cost when working
with inversion-free arithmetic as just discussed. With projective coordinates as described in Section 3.1.1,
let (X1, Y1, Z1) ∈ F32n and (X2, Y2, Z2) ∈ F32n be representations of two curve points P1, P2 different from
the identity. Checking if these two points satisfy
X1/Z1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1
= X2/Z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
x2
(⇐⇒ X1Z2 = X2Z1)
requires two F2n-multiplications—not taking into account additional gates that may be needed to clean up
ancillae.
Working with a different representation of elliptic curves offers an elegant alternative to dealing with
the case distinctions in Figure 1: In [5], Bernstein et al. discuss a representation of ordinary elliptic curves
over F2n which affords a complete addition law, i. e., the addition of any two curve points is handled with
the very same formula. For n ≥ 3 (which is especially safe to assume in cryptographic applications), each
ordinary elliptic curve is birationally equivalent to such a complete binary Edwards curve [5].
Definition 3.1 (Complete binary Edwards curve). Let d1, d2 ∈ F2n with Tr(d2) = 1. Then the complete
binary Edwards curve with coefficients d1 and d2 is the affine curve defined by
d1(x+ y) + d2(x
2 + y2) = xy + xy(x+ y) + x2y2.
We will write EB,d1,d2(F2n) for the set of (F2n-rational) points on this curve.
The identity element of a complete binary Edwards curve is (0, 0) ∈ EB,d1,d2(F2n), and for any two
points P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) in EB,d1,d2(F2n), their sum is P3 = (x3, y3) with
x3 =
d1(x1 + x2) + d2(x1 + y1)(x2 + y2) + (x1 + x
2
1)(x2(y1 + y2 + 1) + y1y2)
d1 + (x1 + x21)(x2 + y2)
and
y3 =
d1(y1 + y2) + d2(x1 + y1)(x2 + y2) + (y1 + y
2
1)(y2(x1 + x2 + 1) + x1x2)
d1 + (y1 + y21)(x2 + y2)
.
Similar to working with a short Weierstrass form, one can pass to projective coordinates to avoid costly
inversions. In [5] an explicit addition formula is given to compute a representation (X3, Y3, Z3) of the sum of
two points on a complete binary Edwards curve, represented projectively as (X1, Y1, Z1) and (X2, Y2, Z2).
The formula involves 21 general multiplications in F2n , three multiplications by the parameter d1, one
multiplication by the parameter d2, 15 additions of F2n-elements, and one squaring:
W1 = X1 + Y1, W2 = X2 + Y2, A = X1 · (X1 + Z1), B = Y1 · (Y1 + Z1),
C = Z1 · Z2, D = W2 · Z2, E = d1C
2, H = (d1Z2 + d2W2) ·W1 · C,
I = d1Z1 · C, U = E +A ·D, V = E +B ·D, S = U · V,
X3 = S · Y1 + (H +X2 · (I +A · (Y2 + Z2))) · V · Z1,
Y3 = S ·X1 + (H + Y2 · (I +B · (X2 + Z2))) · U · Z1,
Z3 = S · Z1.
These formulae can be translated into a quantum circuit for adding arbitrary (variable) curve points:
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Proposition 3.3. Denote by (X1, Y1, Z1) and (X2, Y2, Z2) projective representations of two (not necessarily
distinct) points P1, P2 ∈ EB,d1,d2 . Then the point addition
|X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |X2〉 |Y2〉 |Z2〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 −→|X1〉 |Y1〉 |Z1〉 |X2〉 |Y2〉 |Z2〉 |X3〉 |Y3〉 |Z3〉
can be implemented in overall depth 5DM (n) + 4max(DM (n), 2n) + O(1), where the argument 2n of
max(·) as well as the O(1) reflect CNOT gates only, and T -depth 9DTM (n). Further, a total of 39GM (n)
plus 8n2 + O(n) CNOT gates suffice. The total number of T -gates is 39GTM (n). At this, (X3, Y3, Z3) is a
projective representation of P1 + P2. This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Proof: To implement the above addition formulae, we proceed as follows:
1. Compute in parallel the values W1,W2 as well as X1 +Z1 and Y1 +Z1, Y2 +Z2, and X2 +Z2 from
the input values X1, Y1, Z1,X2, Y2, Z2—this can be done in constant depth using O(n) CNOT gates.
In addition we use (depth 1) additions to |0〉 to create ‘work copies’ W ′2 of W2, Z ′1 of Z1, and Z ′2, Z ′′2
of Z2 using 3n CNOT gates.
2. Using four general F2n-multipliers and two matrix vector multiplications, compute in parallel the
values A, B, C , D = W2 · Z ′2, along with d1Z ′′2 and d2W ′2. As all involved multipliers operate on
disjoint sets of wires, this can be done in depth max(DM (n), 2n) using no more than 4GM (n) plus
2 · (n2 + n) gates (the latter accounting for CNOT gates).
3. Compute (in preparation for computing H) the value d1Z ′′2 + d2W ′2 and create ‘work copies’ A′ of A,
B′ of B, C ′ of C , and D′ of D using O(n) CNOT gates and constant depth.
4. Using five general F2n-multipliers and two matrix vector multiplications, compute in parallel the
values E = d1C2, W1 ·C ′, A ·D, B ·D′, A′ · (Y2 +Z2), B′ · (X2 +Z2) and d1Z1. This can be done
in depth max(DM (n), 2n) with no more than 5GM (n) plus 2 · (n2 + n) gates (the latter accounting
for CNOT gates).
5. Compute U and V and create ‘work copies’ U ′ of U and V ′ of V in constant depth using O(n) CNOT
gates.
6. Using five general F2n-multipliers, find H , I , S, U ′Z ′1 and V ′Z1 using 5GM (n) gates in depth
DM (n).
7. Compute I + A · (Y2 + Z2) and I + B′ · (X2 + Z2) in constant depth using O(n) CNOT gates.
Moreover, generate a ‘work copy’ S′ of S using n CNOT gates and maintaining constant depth.
8. Using four general F2n-multipliers, compute in parallel X2 ·(I+A ·(Y2+Z2)) and Y2 ·(I+B(·X2+
Z2)), SX1 and S′Y1, in depth DM (n) using 4GM (n) gates.
9. Involving O(n) CNOT gates, compute H+X2 · (I+A · (Y2+Z2)) and H+Y2 · (I+B · (X2+Z2))
in depth 2.
10. Multiply H +X2 · (I + A · (Y2 + Z2)) with V ′Z1, H + Y2 · (I + B · (X2 + Z2)) with U ′Z ′1, and
compute Z3 = S · Z1. This can be done using 3GM (n) gates in depth DM (n).
11. Compute X3 by adding S′Y1 to (H + X2 · (I + A · (Y2 + Z2))) · V ′Z1 and Y3 by adding SX1 to
(H + Y2 · (I +B · (X2 + Z2))) · U
′Z ′1 in depth 1 using O(n) CNOT gates.
11
The above circuit has depth 3DM (n)+2max(DM (n), 2n)+O(1) with the argument 2n of max(·) as well as
the O(1) originating in CNOT gates. The number of gates is bounded by 21GM (n) plus 4n2+O(n) CNOTs.
‘Uncomputing’ auxiliary qubits by running the circuit backwards—with the exception of the multiplications
Z3 = S · Z1, H + Y2 · (I + B
′ · (X2 + Z2)) · U
′Z ′1, H +X2 · (I + A · (Y2 + Z2)) · V
′Z1, and the final
additions to compute X3 and Y3—yields the desired bound. 
Making use of the (linear-depth and polynomial-size) multiplication circuits in [1], for asymptotic pur-
poses we obtain the following corollary from the above proposition.
Corollary 3.1. Two points on an Edwards curve in projective representation can be added in linear depth
with a polynomial-size quantum circuit.
Proof: This follows immediately from the multiplier architectures described in [1], which have linear depth
and involve only a polynomial number of gates. 
4 Conclusion
The circuits for binary elliptic curve arithmetic we have presented here are most likely not ‘optimal’ yet,
but they give ample evidence that incorporating results from the classic elliptic curve literature in quantum
circuit design is worthwhile: it is possible to bring down the number of gates and T -gates that need to be
protected against errors and it is possible to reduce the overall circuit depth and T -depth. We hope that our
results stimulate follow-up work on the design of efficient quantum circuits for elliptic curve arithmetic—
including the case of fields of odd characteristic. For adequately evaluting the cryptanalytic potential of
quantum computers, this appears to be a fruitful and important research avenue.
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